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Abstract 
 
 This study empirically estimates the determinants of aggregate voter participation rates 
between 1960 and 1996 using instrumental variables.  Other things equal, an increase in the 
public’s dissatisfaction with politicians decreases voter participation, an increase in the highest 
marginal tax rate increases voter participation, and Watergate had a sustained negative effect 
on voter participation. 
 
Introduction 
 
 Since Downs (1957) introduced the idea of the rational voter there have been numerous 
empirical studies to test the construct.  Typically, these studies have employed cross-section data 
to ascertain the predictive ability of various demographic and election-specific variables on the 
probability of voter participation (Brazel and Shapiro, 1994; Green and Shapiro, 1994; Lapp, 1999; 
and Green and Nikolaw, 1999). 
 This investigation seeks to provide an additional dimension to the empirical study of voter 
participation rates.  Namely the purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the 
determinants of aggregate voter participation rates over time.  The present study includes the 
use of a dissatisfaction index and the use of aggregated time series data.  The dissatisfaction 
index is constructed as an equally weighted average of three normalized indices reflecting 
responses to the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research (ISR) surveys concerning 
whether government wastes tax dollars.  Values for this index lie within a range of negative 1.5, 
which corresponds to least dissatisfied, to positive 1.5 which corresponds to most dissatisfied.  
Thus, the higher the value of this index, the higher the public’s dissatisfaction with government.  
The voter dissatisfaction index potentially allows for the measurement of voter attitudes toward 
government and potentially proxies for voter beliefs regarding the importance and effectiveness 
of their votes.  The time series framework also includes other variables that are expected to affect 
voter participation rates through time. 
 
A Simple Rational Voter Model of Participation 
 
 The original rational choice model calculated the rewards to voting, R, as 
 
R = P*B – C,           (1) 
 
where P is probability of the supported candidate winning, B is the net benefit between the 
preferred candidate’s winning and the opposing candidate’s winning, and C is the cost of voting 
(Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). 
 The purpose here is to use the rational voter theory as a basis to test changes in voter 
participation using a time series model employing national data from 1960 to 1996.  
Consequently, we formulate the determinants of P and B into a general model and derive the 
expected signs.  The determinants of benefits are 
 
B = f (I, CH, D)           (2) 
 
where I is the importance of the office for which the election is being held, CH is the desire for 
change and a proxy for the distance between two candidates on identifiable issues, and D  is the 
voter’s evaluation of the political system’s functioning efficacy: BI > 0, BCH >0, and BD < 0. 
 Combining equations 2 and 3 into 1 yields, 
 
R = P*B(I, CH, D) – C          (3) 
 
First derivatives for each argument in equation (3) are RBI > 0, RCCH > 0, RBD < 0.  Thus, we 
expect that the importance of the election and the perceived difference in benefits between the 
candidates will both increase voter turnout, while reduced confidence in the system or increased 
dissatisfaction with governmental efficacy will reduce voter participation.  
 
Data, Empirical Model and Results 
 
 Since presidential elections offer an opportunity to vote for an important policy maker in 
conjunction with other elected offices, in presidential election years the benefits of voting are 
presumably increased.  Thus the expected net benefits from voting presumably rise during 
presidential election years (PRESDUMt).  This is because the marginal cost of voting for President 
are effectively zero for anyone who has already appeared to cast a ballot whereas the perceived 
benefits from voting for President are larger to the extent that one believes that one has a 
potential (however minute) impact on the election to the most important political office in the 
world.   
 Dissatisfaction or reduced confidence in the operation of government will result in 
declining perceived benefits of voting.  The perception that a candidate will be unresponsive or 
ineffectual in pursuing favored policies reduces the perceived benefits of voting.  Watergate 
(WATERGATE) may have engendered such cynicism among the voting eligible population that 
they perceived diminished value in making the effort to elect officials who were likely to be 
unresponsive or ineffectual.  Indeed, the Watergate scandal may have created an increased 
expectation among potential voters of “betrayal” by politicians in general. 
 An additional measurement of the public’s dissatisfaction (DIS) with (or distrust of) 
government is included in the model to systematically measure voter dissatisfaction with 
government officials (elected or not) over the entire test period.  Again, increased dissatisfaction 
with government performance arguably will reduce the perceived benefits of voting and hence 
reduce voter participation.  
 Finally, since higher federal income tax rates reduce disposable real incomes and have 
numerous negative consequences for individuals and the aggregate economy, higher income tax 
rates will magnify voting benefits. 
 Based on the above framework, the model of voter participation rates involves estimating 
the following reduced-form equation: 
 
VPRt = α0 + βPRESDUMt + β2MAXTAXt-1 + β3Watergatet + β5TREND + εt   (4) 
 
where: 
VPRt = the voter participation rate in year t, as a percent; 
α0 = constant term; 
PRESDUMt = 1 during presidential election years and 0 otherwise; 
MAXTAXt-1 = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, as a percent; 
Watergatet = 1 for years after the Watergate scandal and = 0 otherwise; 
DISt = the level of the public’s dissatisfaction with government over year t, as measured by the 
dissatisfaction index, ranging from -1.5 for least dissatisfied to +1.5 for most dissatisfied; 
TREND = a linear trend;  
Εt = stochastic error term; 
 
 The study period runs from 1960 through 1996.  The VPR, is measured for even numbered 
years.  This is because even numbered years are when all members of the House and one-third 
of the U.S. Senate are elected and, on alternate even numbered years when the President is 
elected.  The odd numbered years typically do not correspond to the election of “significant” 
officials.  The VPR, data were obtained from IDEA: Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997(1999).  The 
variable DIS, is represented by the “dissatisfaction” index.  The data for the maximum marginal 
federal personal income tax (MAXTAX) variable, which is used as a measure of the progressivity 
of the federal personal income tax rate schedule, are obtained from  
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/individual/schedule.cfm. 
 The ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and P-P (Philips-Perron) tests both confirm that the 
variable VPRt is stationary in levels with a trend variable and that variables MAXTAXt-1 and DISt 
are stationary only in first differences.  Hence, in the estimation provided below, a trend (TREND) 
is included, and the variables MAXTAXt-1 and DISt are expressed in first differences. 
 Given that VPRt is contemporaneous with the dissatisfaction index DISt, the possibility of 
simultaneity bias exists.  To account for this possibility, the model in equation (5) was estimated 
using an instrumental variables (IV) technique, with the instrument being the two year lag of the 
inflation rate of the PPI for total finished goods, i.e., PPINFt-2.  The choice of instrument was 
based on the finding that DISt and PPINFt-2 are highly correlated whereas the two period lagged 
instrument is not contemporaneous with the error terms in the system.  The PPINFLt-2 data were 
obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (1999, Table B-68; 1995, B-67). 
 Estimating equation (4) by IV, using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction yields:  
   
VPRt=49.16 + 14.21 PRESDUMt +0.072 zMAXTAXt-1  -7.48 WATERGATEt -3.7 zDISt -0.26 TREND 
                        (23.65)                    (1.84)                           (-7.04)                         (-2.83)      (-2.23) 
 
DW = 1.88, Rho = -0.03, F = 102.5        (5) 
where terms in parentheses are t-values and z is the first differences operator. 
 In equation (5), all four of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the ten percent level or beyond.  The D-W and Rho statistics indicate 
the absence of serial correlation. 
 The coefficient on variable PRESDUMt is positive and significant at the one percent level.  
This confirms that voters increase participation rates when the outcome of the election is 
considered more important.  The coefficient on the variable WATERGATEt is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  Arguably, the Watergate scandal acted to raise 
voter apathy, perhaps because the scandal discouraged the public who had thought they had 
been empowered by the act of voting when in fact their voting efforts were rewarded with 
betrayal.  The coefficient on the variable DIS is also negative, as expected, and significant at the 
two percent level, implying that the more dissatisfied the voting eligible population is with 
government and the performance of government officials, the more discouraged from 
participation in the voting process they become.  Like the Watergate variable, the DIS variable 
reflects disillusionment with the system.  The coefficient on the tax rate variable is positive but 
significant at only the nine percent level, so that there is only very modest evidence that this tax 
rate variable (as a proxy for personal federal income tax progressivity) raises voter participation. 
 The coefficient on the trend variable, which had been included in order to ensure that the 
VPR variable would be stationary, is negative and significant at the five percent level.  This finding 
presumably reflects the often made observation that there has been a general long term 
downward trend in voter participation in the United States.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 The purpose of this study was to throw some light on how the degree to which time 
variation in voter participation could be explained.  The aggregate voter participation rate 
appears to be positively and significantly affected by the opportunity to vote in Presidential 
elections.  Alternatively, the Watergate scandal and increased public dissatisfaction with 
government appear to have significantly discouraged voter participation.  In addition, there is 
modest evidence that the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate, as a measure of 
federal personal income tax progressivity, affects voter participation positively.  Finally, there is 
evidence of a long-term downward trend in aggregate voter participation rates during the period 
under study. 
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